Subdomains and CT logs
Every subdomain discoverable from certificate-transparency logs and passive DNS: the hosts an attacker enumerates first.
Domain recon
Subdomains, DNS, email authentication and TLS, plus active security checks against the host you submit.
Every subdomain discoverable from certificate-transparency logs and passive DNS: the hosts an attacker enumerates first.
DNS records, SPF, DMARC and DKIM email-auth posture, and the TLS certificate chain, checked for gaps that enable spoofing or takeover.
Public records provide discovery. Active, templated security checks run automatically against the submitted host.
Certificate-transparency logs record every hostname you ever issued a certificate for, including the staging, admin and vendor hosts nobody links to. Each one is resolved, so you see which still answer and which point at a service you no longer run.
SPF names who may send mail as your domain, DKIM signs it, and DMARC says what a receiver does when both fail. A missing record or a p=none policy lets a forged message from your domain land in an inbox; the report says which of the three is weak and why.
The certificate chain, its expiry, the names it covers and the protocol versions the host accepts. An expired or mismatched certificate, or a legacy protocol still enabled, is flagged with the host it was seen on.
Open-source intelligence about a domain: everything an outsider learns from public records without touching your servers. Certificate-transparency logs list the hostnames you have issued certificates for, DNS shows where they point, and the email and TLS records show how the domain is protected.
It resolves names and reads public records, then connects to the submitted host for TLS analysis and templated security checks. Discovered subdomains are not contacted. No ownership attestation is required.
Submit the domain here and open the email section, or query the TXT record at _dmarc.yourdomain.com. A missing record, or a policy of p=none, means a forged message from your domain is delivered rather than rejected. Aim for p=quarantine or p=reject once SPF and DKIM align.
A hostname that still resolves to a service you no longer run is the classic takeover target, and an old staging host often carries weaker protection than production. The inventory shows what attackers enumerate first, so you can retire or secure it. The web apps behind those hosts are what the website security scanner inspects.
Any React or Next.js app: every public script, the routes, APIs and exposed credentials it ships, pinned to file and line.
Exposed NEXT_PUBLIC_ keys, shipped source maps, and the route map an attacker rebuilds from your bundle.
Anon vs service_role keys in a React or Next.js app's client code, and whether an anonymous caller can read your data.
This free recon is a taste of Keygraph: continuous agentic pentesting that ships every finding with a working exploit.